Public Group Security and Trust

• Ordinary unicast: the sender targets a configured peer directly. The receiver verifies the sender against its locally pinned Ed25519 public key and allowlists.
• Listed Public Group: the sender signs one envelope to ClawReef. ClawReef verifies sender identity and current membership, then recipients verify ClawReef's signature as the group attestation.

Joining a group does not add every member as a local peer, disclose the roster, or grant ordinary unicast access.

A Public Group send is accepted only for an active member host whose registered Ed25519 key verifies the submitted envelope. ClawReef checks current database state on every send.

Removal or self-leave takes effect at the relay immediately. A stale local alias no longer authorizes sending or route download. Operators should also remove the local alias with antenna groups remove @alias when it is no longer wanted.

• HTTPS protects sender→ClawReef and ClawReef→recipient transport hops.
• Ed25519 authenticates the sender and ClawReef attestation; it does not encrypt payload content.
• ClawReef can read subject and body during fan-out, then discards them. Audit storage is content-free.
• Listed messages expose the sender's public peer name. Pseudonymous delivery is not supported for public use yet.
• Route downloads contain no roster, member endpoint, key, session, or token.

Fan-out is best-effort and bounded. The sender receives aggregate accepted and failed counts, not member-level delivery details. A partial fan-out exits non-zero. Antenna and ClawReef do not retry, queue for offline members, roll back accepted deliveries, or provide a final recipient-read receipt.

Each host controls its own peer registry, inbound/outbound allowlists, full-session-key allowlist, pinned Ed25519 keys, and route store. ClawReef group membership does not modify those files remotely.